From the Indiana Democracy Consortium

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Democracy and the Modern World:
Prospects and Challenges

Conference highlights

June 29-30, 2007

Sponsored by the Indiana University College of Arts and Sciences, the School of Law—Bloomington, and the School of Public and Environmental Affairs

Civil Society and Governance

"Civil Society" is a term that has assumed a rare distinction in global political discourse: it has been so thoroughly overused and "stretched" that it has become increasingly difficult to define specifically what one means when they talk about it. This is unfortunate. While there is considerable debate about the definitional boundaries of civil society as a concept, there is remarkable agreement about the importance of civic associations in terms of their ability to build trust, minimize corruption, and develop strong community linkages among citizens. In their ideal form, such organizations are immensely helpful in reducing communal violence and extremism, in fostering economic growth at the local and regional level, and in building politically active and engaged publics.

Through three panel sessions, participants tackled a number of significant issues, ranging from the role played by non-governmental organizations in developing civic associations, to the legal frameworks that govern both NGOs and civil society, to the practical realities of incorporating academic knowledge with on-the-ground realities. These are the key insights of these panel sessions:

1. While important, NGOs cannot serve as a substitute for citizen-based civic associations:

   While panelists disagreed on whether NGOs can effectively represent citizen interests, there was little question that they are not as beneficial as locally-built “organic” civil associations. The role of NGOs in the context of democracy-promotion and civil society creation is not a trivial one, particularly in post-conflict states where the threat of 'state failure' is ever-present. NGOs, both foreign and domestic, assume critical roles in the process of governance, often at the expense of local engagement. While some panelists saw this dilemma as a second-best solution that helps to achieve delivery of key services, other panelists expressed concern that NGOs that essentially supplant citizen-led involvement in favor of externally provided (at worst) or co-produced (at best) policy goods do a disservice to the democratic project. This suggests that NGOs may be a short-term bromide for the lack of citizen-led associations that retards the long-term development of civil society. In other words, the achievements of NGOs can come at the cost of civil society growth.

2. An ideal civil society is "free, associational, peaceful, inclusive, and voluntary."

   Consistent with current academic work in the area of civic life, panelists agreed that civil society institutions exist in many forms, some good for a tolerant democratic society and some bad. The former type, known as 'bridging' social capital, allows for different segments of society to work across communal boundaries. This increases the likelihood that nascent democracies will succeed by giving citizens a sense of sharing a common fate. This does much to minimize the centrifugal ethnic and communal tendencies we observe in many post-conflict states. Common types of this form of civil society include clubs and associations centered around hobbies and occupations, multi-ethnic labor unions, and neighborhood associations that work to address local policy provision. The latter type of civil society, known as ‘bonding’ social capital, is characterized by its non-inclusiveness and is associated with increasing the likelihood of inter-communal acrimony. Common types of this form of civil society include church and religious groups, associations that advocate specific language or cultural attributes, and non-multi-ethnic labor unions. Critically, panelists argued that NGO activity and international assistance for ‘civil society promotion’ must be careful to advocate bridging social capital instead of the more pernicious bonding types of civil society.

3. Legal frameworks governing NGO behavior must focus on transparency and public impacts:

   Building on previous discussions, panelists noted that permissive legal environments, coupled with a poor international regulatory framework, enable many NGOs to engage in malfeasance. Moreover, many NGOs hide otherwise exclusionary and biased behavior under the mask of charity. Panelists argued that efforts to develop the legal apparatuses to enable NGO activity must also ensure that such organizations are behaving in a way that advances the democratic project. First, they note the importance of transparency, both in terms of NGO activity but also with donors who contribute to them. This is particularly important given the ever-growing scope of what constitutes 'charity'. This leads to the second recommended principle; the insistence on positive public impacts. In contrast to exclusionary outputs aimed at bettering specific communal groups at the expense of other societal segments, panelists agreed that statutes should attempt to more carefully outline the ways in which NGO activity might hurt associational life. One way to do this is through a larger focus on educational activity, particularly in terms of civic education that advances the principles of responsible representative government.

4. It is important to address the incongruencies between experts' and funders' expectations:

   Panelists with direct experience in the civil society promotion field noted that many foundations and government funding sources issue mandates to NGOs and practitioners that are based on a poor understanding of on-the-ground realities. Unfortunately, many practitioners, fearful of the loss of funding, are hesitant to point out weaknesses in funding agencies’ thinking. Funding organizations bring their own normative judgments to bear when deciding how to distribute monies, yet their perspectives are often not consonant with extant realities on the ground. To this end, panelists agreed that it is sometimes necessary for practitioners to challenge the assumptions of funding agencies, despite the obvious risks. Of equal importance, panelists (especially the practitioners) noted that academics had considerable expertise on an array of issues that NGOs simply do not have. Stronger partnerships between universities and practitioners were necessary. Similarly, one panelist suggested that academics should 'report back' to the places where they conduct research. The consequences of academic research are not merely related to tenure and promotion. Rather, there is much to be learned by the people who are being studied. Practitioners noted that local citizens are not blind to their dilemmas. What they often lack is a way to relate complex problems together in a way that allows them to understand effective solutions. The duty of academics is to make knowledge useable or to impart some substantive significance to new knowledge.

State-Building

Members of the State-Building Section critically assessed both the normative and positive claims about the role of democratization in the state-building process. Do we seek procedural democracy as a long-term goal simply because we assume it to be superior to other modes of collective choice in forging a common national bond? Is the communal extremism that has almost universally accompanied democratic transitions in the global south justified by the possibility, however remote, that elections will yield moderation in the long run? Finally, what does ‘state-building’ mean in the contemporary world, particularly in terms of the minimization of communal violence and international terrorism?

In tackling these issues, panelists initially struggled with the idea of linking third-wave transition states in Eastern Europe with contemporary cases of democracy-building. At root, this discussion emerged from the observation that social scientists initially developed transition theories around the post-1989 collapse of communism. The following are the key conclusions gleaned from their discussions.

1. Democracy-assistance cannot assume that a move away from authoritarianism automatically constitutes a victory for democratization:

   The collapse of authoritarianism and the ‘opening’ of political space is no guarantee of democratic reform. Indeed, the holding of elections in post-authoritarian contexts may only serve to produce a new political hierarchy that is unwilling to share political power. As one panelist noted in this discussion, external advocates for democratization are very capable when it comes to providing assistance about how formal institutions ostensibly work, but tend to do a very poor job at building the relevant infrastructures that support viable long-term democracy. Specifically, two panelists observed that advice given to democratizers is generally poor and fails to incorporate domestic political concerns, particularly in terms of the primacy given to electoral system design. According to this perspective, the ‘creation’ of infrastructures for democracy is only successful if there exists a viable political community capable of using it. When such a community is absent, particularly in the form of political parties and a free press, it is entirely likely that free and fair elections will yield only the most ephemeral of democratic politics.

2. Political party assistance is an important and under-emphasized step in effective democracy-building:

   Post-conflict states cannot simply be expected to build the infrastructure of democracy. While elections and the other trappings of procedural democracy are important they cannot guarantee that viable political parties will emerge to contest for votes. Moreover, the institutional incentives faced by parties may not be amenable to the process of state-building, especially if we value competitive elections as a signal of successful state-building. This occurs when successful parties use the immediate period following the collapse of authoritarianism to set up rules that inhibit potentially competitive political parties from forming. As one panelist noted, what value do successful parties see in democracy-building when they stand to lose the most should the reform process succeed?

3. Elections happen too soon:

   Perhaps the key conclusion of the State-Building Panel was that electioneering is a poor means of promoting state-building and democracy. Simply put, immediate elections in post-conflict states will most assuredly devolve into a communal census that winning groups see as justification of their political dominance. It turns the political sphere into a zero-sum environment. Instead of early elections, panelists instead focused on things like party-assistance, conflict resolution and mediation, and other strategies aimed at providing the infrastructures for governance.

4. There is no linear path of democratization and poor theories that fail to stress this fact do ill-service to practitioners:

   Efforts at policy formation vis-à-vis post-conflict states have been ill-served by simplistic theories, or perhaps more accurately, by the simplistic translation of complex theories. While academics have produced more nuanced ways of understanding political change, these theories have been difficult to translate into policy. This is as much the fault of academics as it is the practitioner. Indeed, both academics and practitioners in attendance conceded this problem and viewed efforts such as the conference as a means of ameliorating the difficulties of translating theory into practice. As a response, panelists suggested that academic work in the area of democratization pay more attention to the policy implications of their theories, including the possible political costs associated with policy implementation.

5. Nation-building and State-building are different and must be treated as such:

   Several academics on the panel noted that, despite the observed distinctions between nation and state-building, many social scientists tend to assume a 1:1 relationship between the two processes. Unfortunately most post-authoritarian states and former colonies are highly multi-ethnic. This presents a significant problem since it is difficult to introduce purely civic notions of national identity. If we are interested in building democratic state institutions that do not devolve into crude ethnic censuses then it is important to seek ways to minimize the propensity for parties and factions to emerge along purely communal lines. Unfortunately, as several panelists noted, in our rush to build democracies we fail to recognize that protean national allegiances already exist in the form of ethnic and communal ties that trump any efforts at immediate democratic state-building.

Constitutionalism

At root, the three panel sessions for the Constitutionalism and Rule of Law section are intimately concerned with the difficulties associated with the procedural mechanisms that underlie democracy-building initiatives. We accept, prima facie, that constitutional democracy requires some form of public participation, yet key concepts such as the rule of law are often assumed to simply develop once a successful election takes place. Beyond this, issues related to post-authoritarian reconciliation, inter-communal relations among different groups, questions related to gender equity, and issues associated with economic growth are all reflective of the types of dilemmas that straddle both the purely procedural arenas of constitutionalism and the more ephemeral areas of politics that are difficult to legislate.

Given the understanding that constitutional design is critical to laying the institutional foundations of a well-functioning democratic society, the members of the Constitutionalism and Rule of Law section debated the utility of democratic elections and the deficiencies associated with purely procedural democratic reforms.

1. Immediate elections are no measure of successful democratization:

   Surprisingly, there was minimal disagreement about the claim that post-conflict states would do well to avoid the pitfalls of immediate democratic elections. Despite the generally accepted idea that fully-formed democratic institutions were more likely to produce the long-term economic and political conditions necessary for good governance and moderation, the overwhelming majority of session participants agreed that the prerequisites of good democracy were simply too difficult to produce in sufficient measure to ensure stable governance. One observer noted that the holding of premature elections in Iraq virtually ensured significant ethno-communal strife since the outcome of any election in post-Hussein Iraq was viewed as an ethnic census and as a means to legitimate one ethnic party over others. Another panelist agreed with this assessment, adding that the deep ethno-religious element we see in Iraq causes elections to be seen in very zero-sum terms. Voters see electoral victory in terms of ethnic survival.

2. Trust is important for constitutional democracy, but not for the reasons we are often given:

   Trust is typically cast as an important aspect of consolidated democracy because it is critical to forging civil society. Put simply, we assume that it give citizens a stake in good governance. Several panelists disagreed with this however, suggesting that the role of trust is far more basic. These panelists argued that constitutional democracy only succeeds when parties and their members can agree, prior to an election, that they will honor the outcome. This implies that losers will not cry foul and reject the outcome and will take their place as the loyal opposition. Winners, in contrast, will accept that there is such a thing as loyal opposition and will not use their position to hound, browbeat and otherwise persecute their political opponents. The key dilemma in post-conflict states is that no one can commit to such a position. What is needed is less a model of interpersonal trust building and more of an institutional mechanism that is less likely to raise communal fears or to imperil notions of ethnic dignity. Panelists disagreed about the specific structure of such institutions, but generally found two key pillars upon which to begin discussion. First, one discussant stressed the key role of rational interdependence of citizens. Citizens need to understand that their best interests are encapsulated in sustained communal peace. For this to occur it is critical that issues not be cast purely in zero-sum terms. Second, it is important that political elites from different communal groups be able to communicate with each other in an institutional context that does not reward extremism.

3. While efforts at post-conflict national forgiveness are important, there is a difference between "truth" and "reconciliation":

   Many post-authoritarian states have used Truth and Reconciliation panels to address historic atrocities. These Commissions allow victims and perpetrators to come before a public forum to present their stories in an effort to lay bare the crimes of the previous regime as well as to seek public atonement for the actions they may have taken as agents of authoritarian governments. Significantly, perpetrators are not subjected to criminal prosecution for past crimes, often as a consequence of pre-negotiated rules that grant legal pardons in exchange for cooperation on the part of rights violators. Can justice be truly served in this way. Panelists noted that the pursuit of truth is an effort for victims to establish a historical record. Reconciliation, on the other hand, is a specific attempt to seek absolution for past crimes. While some panelists argued that these goals were, in fact, one in the same, others suggested that there exist stark differences between them. Moreover, panelists asked what truth and reconciliation commissions contribute to the process of democracy-building? One panelist argued that commissions were perhaps most important in terms of humanizing victims who had no recourse to rule of law under the previous regime. According to this perspective, truth and reconciliation commissions provide victims with the opportunity to reclaim their status as citizens through the public performance of their testimony. Perhaps more critically, commissions serve an important role in the nation-building process by recognizing victims of past abuses as a legitimate part of society. This, perhaps as much as any other argument, claims a central part in the panel’s discussion of how we link constitutionalism to the state and nation-building process.

4. Efforts to constitutionally enshrine gender-based legislative quotas carry significant costs, as well as potential long-term benefits:

   Afghanistan and Iraq have both, with considerable pressure from international actors, provided opportunities for women to increase formal political participation. In both countries, constitutional provisions afforded 25% of parliamentary seats to women in an effort to change the ostensibly patriarchal nature of political decision-making. While many in the West perceive these requirements as a positive step, both in terms of gender equality and as a necessary prerequisite for democracy-building, the fact that they are generally imposed by Western interests reeks of neo-colonialism. Does the rule-of-law require some degree of organic development, or as the example of gender politics illustrates, is it possible to externally promote particular values in an effort to bolster future democracy? Panelists were particularly divided over the implications presented by couching gender equality with issues pertinent to the domestic formation of rule of law. Two primary themes quickly emerged. The first position, while recognizing the potential limits of externally mandated democracy-building, saw constitutional mandates aimed at gender empowerment as positive. According to this perspective, criticisms that female parliamentarians would be little more than puppets for male party leaders were irrelevant since most party backbenchers, male or female, are subject to the directives of party leadership in parliamentary systems. What is significant is the fact that such rules open up opportunities for future change. In contrast, other panelists saw legislative quotas for women as potentially harmful. According to this viewpoint, efforts to promote women’s participation had little chance of achieving the goal of promoting gender equality issues since most female parliamentarians would be subject to strong patriarchal pressures. Moreover, two panelists noted that other successful democracies, including those with high rates of gender equality, had no constitutional provisions requiring quotas. This suggests that efforts to increase the social and gender diversity of legislatures are likely to be more successful when they develop from within a country’s political culture and are organically developed into formal political institutions.